Measuring Offender Discount Rates: An Overview of the Issues and a Suggested Methodology by Torre, Andrew
Measuring Offender Discount Rates: An 
Overview of the Issues and a Suggested 
Methodology 
Andrew Torre† 
Criminologists assert that some offenders exhibit impulsive behaviour. If this is correct then this 
impulsiveness will manifest itself through high discount rates. However discount rates are 
difficult to observe and measure. In this paper a methodology is proposed, which considerably 
reduces the complexity of this task, through observing the offender’s actual plea decision. This is 
a valuable exercise because the results can be usefully utilised in formulating policy as well as 
providing insights into offender psychology. 
Introduction 
It is a well accepted principle in economic and finance theory that a dollar received 
now is not equivalent to a dollar received one year subsequently because the former 
can be invested for a period of time at the market interest rate. If the dollar is 
invested it cannot be consumed now and conversely, if it is consumed now it cannot 
be invested. Current and future consumption are like two commodities and 
differences in preferences for these are therefore reflected in differences in relative 
prices. The relative price of the present in terms of future consumption is equal to (1 
+ r);  i.e. giving up one dollar of present consumption yields a future return of (1 + r) 
units of future consumption where ‘r’ is the interest rate paid on foregone present 
consumption. Interest rates prevailing in an economy reflect social rates of time 
preference or the social discount rate. The two latter terms have the same meaning 
and will be used interchangeably in this article. High interest rates imply a low level 
or relative scarcity of total savings and high social time preference or social discount 
rates.  The converse applies to low interest rates. 
Differences in time preference between nations is the basis for capital inflows 
into, and capital outflows from, countries and the source of potential gains from 
inter-temporal trade in monetary capital. If the interest rate is higher in country A 
than B, then A has a higher rate of time preference as domestic saving is relatively 
scarce, indicating that it places a higher value on present as opposed to future 
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consumption, and conversely in B. In the absence of capital flows, in A the last dollar 
of consumption is worth more than the last dollar of investment in machines and 
other productive capacity. On the other hand, in B, consumption is valued less than 
investment at the margin. The different social discount rates provide the opportunity 
for mutually beneficial gains from trade in monetary capital. The existence of an 
international capital market enables A to buy savings to turn into immediate 
consumption from B at the lower interest rate. Consequently, A can finance and 
undertake a higher level of investment and future consumption and at a lower price, 
without cutting back on present consumption than it could have in the absence of 
such a market. B also gains because it can sell some of its excess saving at a higher 
return and consume at a higher level now without cutting back on future 
investment. 
The social rate of time preference or discount rate, and therefore the domestic 
interest rate, is partly the outcome of thousands of individual rates of time 
preference and private discount rates reflected in individual choices between 
consumption now or in the future (saving). The other determinant is the demand for 
this saving by borrowers to finance investment.  
People who commit crime also exhibit implicit discount rates because, like 
decision makers who choose between consuming now or saving, they are forced to 
make value comparisons between immediate and delayed consequences. While in 
the case of the consumption and saving decision, the delayed consequence is a 
certain interest rate, in the crime decision it is expected punishment upon being 
caught and successfully prosecuted. Criminologists argue that offenders invariably 
exhibit high private discount rates at the time of committing the offence, as short 
term advantages are chosen over expected long term costs (Gottfredson and Hirschi 
1990; Wilson and Hernstein 1985). 
At the moment, nothing is known about the value of offender private discount 
rates. It would be useful to those concerned with the administration of criminal 
justice to have plausible estimates of these because they are capable of providing 
important clues about the likely deterrent effect of criminal sanctions such as 
incarceration. In addition, they are a direct test of the link between impulsive 
behaviour and crime. This ignorance about discount rates is not surprising since, 
unlike the quantity of cars bought, for example, discount rates are not directly 
observable. One solution to this problem, which has been utilised in assessing time 
preference in other contexts, is to ask decision makers hypothetical questions to 
reveal their private discount rates. For example, the researcher might ask subjects 
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how much they would be willing to pay to delay having to pay a bill of one dollar by 
one year, or how much compensation they would require to delay receiving a dollar 
by one year. If a subject reported 10 cents to the former question and 15 cents to the 
latter, then the inferred rates of time preference or discount rates would be 10 per 
cent and 15 per cent respectively. Often incentives such as monetary payments are 
made to subjects to encourage them to answer these hypothetical questions as 
truthfully as possible.  In order to minimise the risk of untruthful revelation of dollar 
amounts, the second and more preferable technique utilised is to infer discount rates 
from actual decisions. In the context of crime, this is virtually impossible to do from 
the crime decision itself. However, a good proxy is available for those offenders who 
are caught, prosecuted and convicted; their plea decision. 
When defendants plead guilty or not guilty they reveal an implicit discount 
rate because the consequences of their choice are not immediate due to court delay, 
which can be defined as the time elapsing from the entering of the plea until the final 
disposition of the case. In this article, a methodology for ascertaining discount rates 
from the plea is described as informally as possible. Interpretations using 
hypothetical estimates are then provided and this is followed by an extended 
discussion of how the estimates can inform criminal justice and enforcement policy. 
Methodology 
A defendant will compare the cost of a certain penalty following a guilty plea with 
the expected cost of a penalty following a trial. The latter is expected because there is 
only a probability of conviction or acquittal rather than it being a certain outcome. In 
order to simplify the exposition without any loss of generality, assume that the 
defendant is not granted bail and that the only sentence available is a period of 
incarceration, which would usually be the case for most serious offences. In such a 
case, the cost of a certain jail sentence to the defendant would be equal to the time 
spent on remand, the sentence length, the income foregone and other psychological 
costs from remand until release and the defendant’s private discount rate. The cost 
of an expected jail sentence would include an additional variable; the probability of 
conviction following a trial. The discount rate enters both the cost and expected cost 
expressions because, irrespective of which plea is chosen, the costs are not all 
incurred at the same time. Rather, time elapses between remand in custody or 
release on bail until the passing of sentence following conviction. Often this period is 
quite substantial due to court delays. For example, according to the ABS (2001), in 
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1999-2000 the median wait in weeks from initiation of the case until its finalisation 
for a guilty plea ranged from 10.8 weeks in Tasmania to 27 weeks in NSW. In the 
case of a not guilty plea followed by acquittal the range was from 27.8 weeks in SA 
to 52.90 weeks in the NT, and for a not guilty plea followed by a conviction it varied 
from 29.8 weeks in SA to 67.4 weeks in NSW. 
The key to inferring offenders’ discount rates from information about their 
costs is to focus on the relationship between different values of the discount rate and 
the corresponding variable’s cost and expected cost. If a graph is drawn plotting 
different values of r on the horizontal and cost and expected cost on the vertical axis, 
the curve joining the different points will be negatively sloped. This is because the 
expression for computing the present or discounted value of future (expected) costs 
or income is equal to: PV = Tr)1( +
C , where PV = present or discounted value of costs 
or income;  C = costs; r is the private discount rate; and T = time. Since r appears in 
the denominator, PV will fall as r increases. There will be two such expressions for 
each defendant; one for a guilty plea and one for a trial. Since r appears in the 
denominator of both of them, there is likely to be a value of r called r* that equates 
them in dollar value. At this r*, the defendant will be indifferent between pleading 
guilty or going to trial, since the discounted cost of the guilty plea will equal the 
expected discounted cost of the trial. This is based on the reasonable assumption that 
the defendant will choose the alternative that has the lower cost (jail sentence).  This 
means that if both costs are equal either choice is acceptable.  
Being able to observe in some sense the defendant’s indifference point enables 
estimates of the offender’s actual private r to be obtained. For example, if r* is 
estimated to be 0.10, the defendant chooses a trial, and to the right of r* the expected 
cost of a trial curve is consistently below the cost of a guilty plea curve, then the 
defendant’s private discount rate must be ≥ 0.10. Alternatively, if the defendant 
chooses a guilty plea, the discount rate must be ≤ 0.10. This scenario is illustrated in 
Figure 1a below. The other possibility is that, to the right of r*, the discounted cost of 
a guilty plea is always less than the discounted expected cost of a trial.  The converse 
applies to the left of r*. In this instance, if the guilty plea is chosen, r must be ≥ 0.10 
and ≤ 0.10 if the trial is chosen. This scenario is illustrated in Figure 1b below. 
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When formulating the plea decision a defendant will confront a value of r* that 
depends on the exact sentence length, waiting time, psychic costs, foregone income 
and conviction probability, which he or she confronts. Before confronting the court, 
most of these are unknown. However, a range of plausible values for each of these 
variables can be estimated. Likely waiting times and sentence lengths can be 
obtained from actual published data, such as that detailed in the NSW Bureau of 
Crime Statistics and Research Criminal Courts Statistics Annual Reports (1997-2006) 
. Conviction probabilities range from 0 to 1, so that it is possible to specify a low, 
medium and a high value. Foregone income and psychological cost estimates are 
more difficult to obtain.  Nevertheless, sensible assumptions and the use of accepted 
empirical conventions mean that this task is far from insurmountable. 
Suppose that for the offence of assault occasioning grievous bodily harm, there 
were only three possible sentences (1, 3 or 5 years in jail); three possible waiting 
times (0.5, 1 or 1.5 years);  three possible values of foregone income and 
psychological costs ($10,000, $20,000 or $30,000) for both pleas; and three possible 
conviction probabilities (0.3, 0.5 and 0.8) following a trial. Each defendant would, as 
a consequence, confront 34 or 81 possible combinations of values of sentence lengths, 
waits, foregone income and psychological costs for a guilty plea and 35 or 243 
possible combinations of sentence lengths, waits, foregone income, psychic costs and 
conviction probabilities for a trial. Using a simple simulation computer program, 
these combinations would then be fed into the mathematical expressions for the 
discounted cost of a guilty plea and  discounted expected cost of a trial, with the 
objective of searching for all of the intersection points where the two discounted 
costs are equal. This would be the distribution of possible r* values and 
combinations of curves that the defendant confronted. Some variable combinations 
will yield curves where at r > r*, E(C) < C (NG < G) and at r < r*, E(C) > C (NG > G) 
as in Figure 1a or where at r > r* E(C) > C (NG > G) and at r < r* E(C) < C (NG < G) 
as in Figure 1b. The most likely discount rate for the offence would be the median 
value of this distribution of r* values. 
Policy and Enforcement Implications 
Suppose, for illustrative purposes, that the simulation exercise produces the 
following results (median values of r*) for the offence of assault occasioning actual 
bodily harm: 




The second line in the table refers to the outcome to the right of the estimated 
median value of r*. Consequently, NG < G means that the trial is the cheaper 
alternative and if it is chosen, the discount rate is the lower bound estimate.  If the 
guilty plea is chosen, it is the upper bound estimate (Figure 1a).  NG > G means that 
the guilty plea is the cheaper option and if it is chosen, the estimated discount rate is 
the lower bound estimate. However, if the defendant elects a trial, it is an upper 
bound estimate (Figure 1b). 
Since they are generated from cost information, these inferred discount rates 
have a neat interpretation. They can be construed as the defendant’s willingness to 
pay to defer the cost or expected cost of punishment following a guilty and not 
guilty plea respectively by a year per dollar of the defendant’s income. In this 
instance, at a probability of conviction of 0.3, the median defendant is willing to pay 
a minimum of 20 cents/dollar/income to delay expected punishment (jail) following 
a trial. At a value of P = 0.5 and 0.8, this figure increases to 35 cents/dollar/income 
and 48 cents/dollar/income respectively. Alternatively, the median defendant is 
prepared to pay a maximum of 20 cents/dollar/income to delay certain punishment 
if a guilty plea is chosen, given a probability of conviction after a trial of 0.3. For 
probabilities of 0.5 and 0.8, this figure rises to 35 cents and 48 cents respectively. 
Therefore, from the above results, it is possible to place a lower and upper bound on 
the median willingness to pay to delay certain jail time after a guilty plea of 0.05 
cents to 0.48 cents/dollar/income for this offence. 
If estimates of median discount rates interpreted as willingness to pay values 
are obtained for a series of offences, then legislatures, criminal justice policy makers, 
researchers and enforcement agencies can be provided with clues about the 
deterrent impact of prison sentences on the crime rate, a topic that has spawned a 
large and controversial literature.  
According to Nagin (1998), evidence for a substantial deterrent effect of 
sanctions on criminal behaviour was much firmer at the end of the 1990s than it had 
been two decades earlier. In his review of research into the link between crime and 
punishment, Nagin identified three main empirical approaches adopted by 
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researchers; interrupted time series, ecological and perceptual studies. The first 
examines the effect of targeted and specific policy interventions such as police 
crackdowns on open-air drug markets; the second uses natural variation in crime 
rates and sanction levels across time and space to examine deterrence effects, while 
the third focuses on the links between perceptions of sanction risk and severity to 
self-reported crime and delinquency.  
The approach suggested in this article is novel in that offenders’ attitudes 
toward sanctions can be discerned from actual plea behaviour when confronting 
actual or expected punishment. This obviates the need to ask hypothetical questions. 
Presumably, a high (low) willingness to pay to delay imprisonment - either certain 
or expected  - will reflect the relatively high (low) disutility of prison to the 
defendant.  
The source of this disutility will be psychological or financial, or most 
probably, some combination of both of these factors. In effect, discount rates for 
different offences as they are interpreted in this article are implicit premiums over 
and above the median offender’s wage or salary in his or her most suitable activity 
in the legal labour market. This premium will reflect the offender’s skill and 
education levels as well as the relative profitability or monetary returns from the 
offence. In relation to the latter, criminologists are increasingly documenting very 
high illegal profits from some offences against property. For example, according to 
Stevenson, Forsythe and Weatherburn (2001), the estimated median value of weekly 
earnings for burglars in NSW is $2,000, yielding an annual tax free income of 
$104,000.  
In a provocative paper, Weatherburn and Grabosky (1999) make a plea to 
criminal justice policy makers and enforcement authorities to adopt strategic 
thinking to control property crime rather than relying on the usual formula of more 
police and tougher penalties. Examples of this new way of thinking, which the 
authors espouse, include using health policy effectively to treat people dependent on 
illegal drugs; regulating second hand goods markets to make it less profitable to sell 
stolen goods; and the use of housing policy to limit the extent to which young people 
susceptible to crime grow up in delinquent-prone neighbourhoods. 
While the methodology adopted here cannot separate psychological from pure 
monetary effects in driving willingness-to-pay values, this does not diminish the 
likely usefulness of such an exercise. It is suggested that plausible estimates of 
offender discount rates for a wide variety of crimes will perform an important 
function, not only for the usually given reason of detecting the role of impulsive 
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behaviour in explaining criminal activity, but perhaps more importantly by 
providing another way of examining and estimating the deterrent impact of 
imprisonment for different offences.    
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